Private orderflow

Syntarie's transaction submission is private-first with explicit public opt-in.

What this means in practice

Default: a submitted transaction is encrypted and routed to the validator set via commit-reveal. Mempool peers see commitments, not contents.
Public opt-in: users can mark a tx as "public submit" — it goes through the standard non-encrypted mempool path. Useful for transparency-first transfers (e.g. governance votes).
Selective disclosure: a transaction's metadata (signer, recipient, amount, memo) can be selectively disclosed to chosen counterparties via finalized account-summary disclosures.

The threat model

Private orderflow is not a privacy mechanism for the user-counterparty relationship. The validator set sees plaintext transactions during ordering. What it protects against:

MEV via mempool surveillance — a watcher cannot see your tx until it's in a block.
Front-running by un-permissioned mempool participants — there is no such role; only the validator set sees txs.
Sandwich attacks — eliminated by ordering happening inside the validator set, not on a public mempool.

It does NOT protect:

The validator set itself — they see your tx contents before ordering.
Post-finalization on-chain history — once finalized, tx fields (signer, recipient, amount) are visible to anyone querying chain state.

Beyond the commit-reveal layer, Syntarie supports finalized account-summary disclosures: a Merkle-proven view of an account's history at a specific block height, scoped to chosen fields. Use cases:

Compliance reporting (auditor needs to see account holdings at a specific date)
Selective sharing with KYC providers
Proof-of-solvency without full chain history

The disclosure protocol itself is verifiable offline — you can hand someone a disclosure file + the chain's checkpoint signature and they can verify it without trusting Syntarie.

What's verified

Goal 7 (Privacy / disclosure) at ~91% per LORE-3.
Commit-reveal protocol verified in interface/src/core/commit_reveal.rs + tests.
Account-summary disclosure verified in account_summary_disclosure.rs + the wallet's disclosure verification CLI.
Selective-disclosure replay protection verified by tests_privacy_e2e::* (some tests previously red until Phase 1 of MAKE-IT-GREEN — now green).

What's still open

"MEV / private orderflow" goal at 91% — work continues on adversarial replay scenarios.
The R94 phishing watchlist + scam-trigger productization layer is a separate concern (Goal 3).

Source pointers